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1. Introduction 
 
The sustainability of welfare state programs, and specifically that of public 
pension systems, has been a matter of constant concern in recent decades. The 
marked ageing process that Europe is beginning to experience threatens a 
welfare system organized mainly on a pay-as-you-go basis, where the increasing 
ratio between the working-age (typically ages 16-64) and the economic 
dependent populations (ages 0-15 and 65+) is proving to be critical.  
 
This marked ageing process has been exacerbated by the deep economic crisis 
that began in 2008 and which has left governments between a rock and a hard 
place. Public deficits started to rise dramatically and Social Security systems in 
a number of countries, including Spain, entered the red much sooner than 
predicted by demographic projections. In this context, many countries have 
introduced reforms to their pension systems in an attempt at controlling 
expenditure. One of the most noteworthy measures, in this regard, has been the 
adoption of mechanisms linking retirement pensions to the evolution of the 
social security budget balance, thus making explicit the dependence of the latter 
on demographic and economic factors.  
 
However, changes to pension systems cannot be solely evaluated in terms of 
sustainability. They also need to be assessed in terms of adequacy, i.e., the 
extent to which they guarantee a minimum level of income for the elderly. By 
‘adequate’, the World Bank understands that “all people regardless of their level 
or form of economic activity” have access to benefits “that are sufficient to 
prevent old-age poverty on a country-specific absolute level in addition to 
providing a reliable means to smooth lifetime consumption” (Holzmann and 
Hinz, 2005). As such, an ‘adequate’ system seeks to improve the position of the 
worst off, being compatible with any distribution of income between groups 
and, particularly, with any level of income inequality. Other distribution 
measures have also been considered by international organizations and the 
academic literature for the measurement of adequacy. These include various 
measures of the relative position of the elderly with respect to other groups as 
well as indicators of income inequality within the elderly. 
 
The Ageing Report of the Economic Policy Committee (European Commission, 
2015a) argues that pension systems, and in particular public pension schemes, 
have continued to ensure that most old people in the majority of EU countries 
are protected against the risk of poverty and deprivation and can enjoy living 
standards in line with the rest of the population. In general, the elderly (aged 
65+) are not at any greater risk of poverty than other age groups. Indeed, in most 
countries, the elderly seem to have been better protected against the social 
impact of the recession and the public finance crisis than have other age groups. 
The relative income position of the elderly has generally improved in recent 
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years. The relative median income ratio – median income of people aged 65+ 
as a share of people aged 0-64 –  increased between 2005 and 2013 in 20 out of 
28 Member States, with an increase of more than 15 percentage points in 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Cyprus, Ireland, Spain and Greece. Overall, it is clear 
that the income of older people has been relatively well protected during the 
crisis. This has been observed both in past crises (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005) 
and in the current crisis (European Commission, 2015b). In this respect, when 
measuring the relative position of the older population (by median income ratios, 
for example), Spain is one of the best situated, with ratios close to 100% in 2013 
(European Commission, 2015b). Nevertheless, Spain has been hit particularly 
hard by the crisis, and many pensioner households may also suffer a 
deterioration of their financial situation as a result of sharing their resources 
with the younger generations in the family. 
 
The definition of adequacy and its measurement are themselves an unresolved 
issue in the literature. Several papers and reports discuss existing indicators and 
propose new ones (Borella and Fornero, 2009; European Commission, 2015b; 
Chybalski, 2012). Brady (2010) develops a replacement rate that accounts for 
savings, taxes, and owner-occupied housing. Binswanger and Schunk (2012) 
address adequacy with a randomized survey design, individually tailored to each 
respondent’s financial situation, and conducted in both the U.S. and the 
Netherlands. They find that the majority of individuals aim to achieve a 
spending profile in which retirement spending exceeds 80% of working life 
spending. The minimum desired replacement rates range between 95% for the 
lowest income quintile and 45% for the highest. For the Netherlands, these rates 
fall between 75 and 60%. 
 
Several other studies seek to measure pension adequacy in a specific country. 
Knoef et al. (2016) measure the pension adequacy of the Dutch system, taking 
into account the total resources that people really accumulate. Using a large 
administrative data set, Chia and Tsui (2003) assess the adequacy of 
Singapore’s publicly managed central provident fund system and find that it is 
inadequate to meet the future consumption needs of the female elderly. Others 
take a comparative perspective. For example, Holzmann (2013) reviews key 
recent and ongoing changes that are triggering reforms, outlines the main reform 
trends across pension pillars over the last two decades, and presents key policy 
areas on which the pension reform community needs to focus to make a 
difference.  
 
As for methodology, microsimulation techniques have been introduced to 
complement more macro-oriented simulation models of pension systems, 
especially as regards attempts to simultaneously address sustainability and 
adequacy concerns. Microsimulation models can be used to draw a finer-grained 
picture of the evolution of old-age poverty in the future. Indeed, their use in 
policy evaluation and, particularly, in pension reforms has become fairly 
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widespread (see, e.g., Borella and Coda Moscarola, 2010; van Sonsbeek, 2010; 
Buddelmeyer et al., 2006; Stensnes and Stolen, 2007). This is mainly thanks to 
the availability of an increasing number and quality of databases and computing 
tools. In the specific context in which we are working, these simulation tools 
need to be able to provide both a macro and a micro perspective: the former 
being essential for undertaking a consistent analysis of the sustainability of 
pensions or any other welfare state transfer; the latter being critical for a 
consideration of the adequacy of the benefit or of income redistribution, in 
general.  
 
This paper analyses the impact on the sustainability and adequacy of the Spanish 
pension reform enacted in 2013 (Law 23/2013).1 This reform introduced two 
adjustment factors to foster sustainability. On the one hand de so-called 
“sustainability factor”, linking the amount of the new retirement pensions to the 
evolution of life expectancy. On the other hand, the “annual revaluation index”, 
which is linked to the evolution of the Social Security balance and affects all 
public pensions. To do so, we use an extended version of DyPeS, a 
microsimulation model of the Spanish retirement pension system, incorporating 
the sustainability factors enacted in 2013. DyPeS is a dynamic, time-based, 
behavioural model, employing administrative data provided by the Social 
Security. In conjunction with the sustainability factors, we also implement a set 
of adequacy indicators in order to assess the role of pensions in preventing old-
age poverty, as well as to determine their distributional effects. In short, we seek 
to address the following two questions: a) Is the pension system sustainable in 
the long-run? b) Are pensions sufficient to prevent old-age poverty? b) Are they 
equitable between generations?   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
retirement pension system in Spain. Section 3 presents the microsimulation 
model used in the analysis and Section 4 describes the data and hypotheses 
adopted. Section 5 presents the results regarding the impact of the sustainability 
factors introduced in the 2013 reform in terms of both the sustainability and 
adequacy of the retirement pension system. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the 
main conclusions.     
 
2. Institutional Framework: The Spanish contributory pension system 
 
The Spanish contributory pension system, managed by the Social Security, is 
the most important program of social protection in Spain, in terms of both the 
size of the population protected and the share of expenditure. In 2014, the Social 
Security dedicated 10.5% of GDP to contributory pensions. The contributory 
pension system is organized on a pay-as-you-go basis under a defined benefit 
                                                         
1 See Patxot et al. (2015) for an analysis of the impact of the 2011 reform on sustainability. 
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scheme. Pensioners and workers are classified into different regimes (i.e., the 
General Regime and five Special Regimes) covering retirement, permanent 
disability and survivor pensions. The retirement pension is by far the most 
important program: in December 2014, it accounted for almost 60% of total 
contributory pensions, representing 65% of total Social Security expenditure 
(corresponding to 7.4% of GDP). 
 
The present system was introduced in 1967 when the General Social Security 
Law was enacted. Since then, many partial reforms have been introduced, 
impacting different aspects of the system. The contributory (or Bismarckian) 
nature of the retirement pension system relies basically on the fact that the initial 
pension benefit is dependent, to some degree, on the worker’s past contributions, 
although the worker must have completed a minimum period of contributions. 
Specifically, the initial pension (IP) is determined by applying the percentage 
[p(n)] (which depends on the contribution period) to the regulatory base [RB] 
(defined as the average contribution base over the last years). Moreover, various 
correction coefficients (c) may also apply in certain circumstances (such as 
delayed or early retirement): 
 
IP = RB · p(n) · (1-c)     [1] 
 
The Bismarckian nature of these parameters has been increased as a result of 
subsequent reforms (see Appendix 1 for a summary), although a fully 
contributory system has yet to be achieved. Additionally, retirement pensions 
(and also contributions) are subject to lower and upper limits in pursuit of equity, 
which also mitigate their contributory nature.  
 
In 2011 a major reform of the system was implemented, impacting such key 
characteristics as the general retirement age (for details, see Appendix 1). 
Moreover, it was announced that a “sustainability factor” was to be introduced 
in the pension system by 2027, aimed at taking into account the increase in life 
expectancy. However, this factor was announced in very vague terms and 
without specifying the exact formula. Two years later, and following the 
publication of a report entrusted to an Expert Committee created for that exact 
purpose, Law 23/2013 described how this “sustainability factor” was to work. 
Specifically, it comprised two distinct elements, referred to as the “pension 
revaluation index” (that is, an annual pension update index, henceforth UI) and 
the “sustainability factor” (SF). The UI replaced the consumer price index as 
the reference for updating benefits each year. As such, it affects all pensions in 
the system (not only new entries). The UI is calculated each year (t+1) using the 
following formula:  
 
𝑈𝐼t+1 = ?̅?𝐼,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑝,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑠,𝑡+1 + 𝛼 [
It+1
∗ −Gt+1
∗
Gt+1
∗ ]  [2] 
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where ?̅?  is a moving arithmetic average, estimated for eleven years (the 
corresponding year, five periods before and five periods later), of the variation 
rate in Social Security revenues (sub-index I), the Social Security expenditure 
in contributory pensions (sub-index p) and the substitution effect (sub-index s);2 
I and G represent the moving geometric average of annual Social Security 
revenues and expenditures, respectively, estimated also for eleven years; finally, 
α is a parameter taking a value between 0.25 and 0.33, and revised every five 
years. In this way, the UI seeks to take into account Social Security (im)balances 
(both in past and future predictions) when obtaining the pension benefits. 
However, it is worth noting that there are legally established minimum (0.25%) 
and maximum (consumer price index plus 0.5%) values for the UI, 
independently of the value obtained using the formula. In fact, UI was first 
adopted in updating pensions in 2014, and since then the lower limit (0.25) has 
been applied because the value obtained from Equation [2] was lower. 
 
The sustainability factor (SF) only affects new pensioners joining the system in 
2019 onwards (the date established for its launch). From that date, new pensions 
are to be calculated by correcting downwards (or eventually upwards) the result 
of the standard formula (Eq. 1) by the predicted increase (decrease) in life 
expectancy at the age of 67, as follows: 
 
𝑆𝐹𝑡 = 𝑆𝐹𝑡−1 · 𝑒67
∗      [3] 
 
where t is the first year in which the SF is applied (for 2018, the value of SF will 
be 1), and 𝑒67
∗  is the growth rate in life expectancy at age 67 over the previous 
five years. The parameter 𝑒67
∗  will be estimated every five years.  
 
Several countries have similarly used life expectancy as a reference point for 
introducing a sustainability factor in their pension systems. However, the 
majority have automatically linked increases in life expectancy to pensionable 
ages (Italy, Greece, Denmark and Netherlands) and/or the number of 
contribution years (France and Italy). Spain is one of the few countries (together 
with Portugal and Finland) to link benefit levels to life expectancy. Some 
institutions, including the European Commission, have pointed out that the first 
option is the best way to incentivize people to work longer and, hence, to 
neutralize the costs of structural longevity growth. In contrast, linking benefit 
levels to life expectancy is seen as “far less transparent”, with the implication 
that it “can pose a threat to adequacy over time as people fail to react to financial 
incentives to delay pension take-up” (European Commission, 2015b p.189). To 
                                                         
2 The substitution effect refers to the increase in the average pension system due to the difference 
in the benefits of new entries (new retirees with higher pensions) and system withdrawals 
(typically old people with lower pensions). In this way, after 35 years of contributions, 
individuals reached 100% of the RB, as they had before, but with a different distribution in 
favour of longer (as opposed to shorter) working careers.  
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the extent that the model we are employing in our analysis, described in the next 
Section, is a behavioural model – allowing individuals to react to changes in 
pension system incentives – we should be able to test this, as well as other 
effects of the 2013 reform. 
  
 
3. The model  
 
This section describes the microsimulation model used in this exercise, that is, 
DyPeS. It was developed to analyse the Spanish contributory pension system 
and has been used in previous studies to measure the impact of the 2011 reform 
of the Spanish pension system (Patxot et al., 2015) and the corresponding 
behavioural reaction. DyPeS is a dynamic micro-based model – meaning that it 
simulates micro units over time. It was developed using ModGen, a generic 
dynamic microsimulation programming language designed and maintained by 
Statistics Canada and widely used in social science dynamic microsimulation.3 
This programming language allows the building of two parallel versions of the 
model: the time-based and the case-based versions. The former simulates 
successive cross-sections while the latter simulates each case from birth to death 
before the simulation of the next case begins. In this paper, the time-based 
version is used, due to the nature of the problem we seek to analyse. As we need 
information on Social Security budgets to calculate the annual revaluation index 
(UI), successive periods (years) need to be simulated in order to obtain this 
information. For the same reason, the model is open, in the sense that new agents 
are introduced, apart from those in the initial sample; and population-based, as 
opposed to cohort-based, as all the population – contemporaneous workers and 
pensioners – needs to be simulated every year. 
 
DyPeS runs the simulation starting from the population contained in the 
Continuous Sample of Working Careers (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales 
or MCVL in its Spanish abbreviation). The next section explains this database 
in more detail. It is programmed in continuous time, though some of the events 
happen only once a year. With respect to previous versions of the model 
(Fernández-Díaz et al., 2013; Patxot et al., 2015), here one of the main 
improvements introduced is the calculation and projection of the two adjustment 
factors enacted by the 2013 reform. The implementation of the sustainability 
factor (SF) shown in Equation [3] is quite straightforward, but this is not the 
case of the pension revaluation index (UI in Equation [2]). The UI and the 
projection of Social Security budgets must be simultaneously determined, 
causing obvious problems of recursivity. These problems are solved in DyPeS 
                                                         
3
ModGen supports the creation, maintenance and documentation of most dynamic 
microsimulation model types, including both continuous and discrete time, case and time-based 
models as well as interacting and non-interacting populations. It is freely available at the 
Statistics Canada website. 
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by running the simulation following an iteration process. As shown below, the 
non-limited values of the UI obtained from DyPeS for the first two years of 
application (-1.9% both years) are similar to those obtained by the Ministry and 
AIREF (AIREF, 2014; Roch et al., 2015) (-1.28% in 2015 and between -0.69 
and -3.28% for 2016, depending on the scenario). The model also projects that 
the pension revaluation index will be stuck in the lower band during the 
following decades. This is due mainly to the negative impact of the 2008 
economic crisis on the Social Security budget, but also to the expected negative 
demographic impact (baby-boomers starting to retire from 2020 on). 
 
It is worth mentioning that one of the main advantages of DyPeS is that it 
introduces behaviour into the retirement decision, meaning that it accounts for 
behavioural reactions to financial incentives when individuals opt for retirement. 
This enables us to disentangle the effects of the reform that are related to the 
individuals’ reactions to changes in the regulations (see O’Donoghue, 2001 and 
Li and O’Donoghue, 2013 for a definition of behavioural vs. statistical 
simulation). Microsimulation models that include behaviour in the retirement 
decision are scarce and heterogeneous in their modelling approach. Such models 
are preferably endowed with simple – non-behavioural – rules for retirement, 
assuming, for example, that individuals retire as soon as they become eligible 
(Borella and Coda Moscarola, 2010) or aligning the transitions to observed 
patterns (Dekkers et al., 2008; Richiardi and Leombruni, 2006). However, by 
integrating an econometric analysis with lifecycle theory, the literature on 
retirement behaviour can account for the role played by the financial incentives 
embedded in the pension rule. For example, Stock and Wise (1990) and Coile 
and Gruber (2000) for the United States; Baker et al. (2003) for Canada; 
Blundell et al. (2002) for the United Kingdom; and García-Pérez et al., (2013) 
and Vegas-Sánchez et al. (2013) for Spain, all find that individuals’ retirement 
choices respond to some extent to the financial incentives of the pension system.  
 
To date, there have been a few attempts to introduce behavioural reactions to 
pension rules into microsimulation models. Van Sonsbeek (2010) models the 
retirement decision by adopting the option value approach first suggested by 
Stock and Wise (1990). The author combines individual data on wages, state 
pension and private pension entitlements with individually varied option value 
parameters (time preference, leisure preference and risk aversion). Bianchi et 
al. (2003) also employ an individual reaction function, based on the Stock and 
Wise option value model, in which the worker calculates the expected value of 
the utility of retiring today and in the future, using available information. 
Borella and Coda Moscarola (2010) specifically compare the results of a 
behavioural model with a scenario without behaviour in which people retire as 
soon as possible. The retirement decision is modelled estimating a probit model 
and the main money’s worth measures used in these estimates are the present 
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value of pension benefits (PVB) and the peak value (PV), defined as the 
maximum forecasted accrual at each age.4   
 
In DyPeS, the retirement module determines whether an eligible individual 
actually retires according to a proportional hazard model.5 The data used to 
estimate the parameters governing the retirement decision consist of a monthly 
panel data set covering the period 2005-2010, extracted from the MCVL. It 
includes all individuals eligible for retirement during this period, excluding 
those who retired due to collective agreements or who were forced to do so by 
regulation (unemployed reaching the minimum retirement age). Covariates of 
the model include personal characteristics and financial incentives 
(improvements in expected future pensions). The model is estimated using a 
piecewise constant exponential function approach in which the hazard is 
assumed to be constant within pre-specified survival time intervals, but the 
constants may differ for different intervals. Those older than 58 compute their 
retirement hazards monthly and the covariates that determine the retirement 
decision are also updated monthly. The details of the retirement decision model 
are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
All other events are modelled using information from the official statistics 
(demographics) or using the transition rates obtained from the MCVL. The 
following are the main events experienced by agents: they, first, experience 
birth and, second, entry in the labour market, then labour market transitions 
from employment to unemployment occur until the agents decide to retire and 
eventually die.  
 
Wages and labour market transitions are conditioned by level of education, 
which is assigned as follows. For future contributors, the final education level 
attained determines how they enter the labour market (contribution group, entry 
age and wage), as shown below. Initial wages (for those working or contributing 
in 2007) take the value observed in the fiscal module of the MCVL in 2007. In 
case this value is missing, the contribution basis is used. This information is 
then used to impute future entry wages, while the error term observed in each 
cell is used to ensure the variability of the initial wage. Changes in the level of 
qualification and unemployment events are also derived from the transitions 
observed in the data set. Wages grow according to an econometric model – a 
version of the traditional Mincer model – estimated outside the microsimulation 
model. Next, contribution basis are updated taking into account the minimum 
and maximum thresholds (annually adjusted according to inflation). Appendix 
2 contains a detailed explanation of the wage growth mechanism.  
 
                                                         
4 See Patxot et al. (2015) for a more detailed discussion of behavioural models. 
5 The model parameters are estimated using Stata 11 and are introduced in DyPeS programming 
or directly in the input tables created for that purpose. 
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Once agents reach the eligible age for retirement (fixed from 59 to 75), they 
start computing their expected pensions in each of the available pathways 
depending on their labour market status and, eventually, retire according to the 
survival times estimated by our retirement model. To capture the impact of 
labour market conditions on the probability of retirement, potential pensions are 
weighted by the probability of being unemployed in future years. A model of 
unemployment probabilities for people older than 58 is estimated outside the 
microsimulation model. We explain this probability using variables found 
mainly in the literature, seeking to capture differences in personal characteristics, 
productivity and contextual factors: sex, age, migrant status, educational level, 
contribution group, experience and unemployment rate. 
 
Finally, agents die according to exogenous age and gender-specific mortality 
rates evolving in line with those used in the standard population projections. 
The projection routine of the model starts in 2008. Hence, for events occurring 
before – affecting agents alive in 2007, the observed data are taken from the 
data set.  
 
 
4. Data and assumptions 
 
DyPeS starts from the 2007 wave of the MCVL, excluding self-employed 
workers as there is no enough information to simulate their future wages. 6 The 
year 2007 is chosen as the base year and the reference point for most data. In 
this way, the data employed for transitions are not permanently distorted by the 
effects of the crisis. Nevertheless, other waves of the MCVL are used to estimate 
in more detail labour market transitions, the wage model and the retirement 
model (full details are provided in Appendix 2).  
 
The MCVL extracts 4% of the population registered with the Social Security at 
that point in time. Then, all past information about their working careers and 
contributions is added. This information is reliable from 1980 onwards for their 
working conditions and from 1990 onwards with regard to their pensions. The 
sample includes both pensioners and contributors born between 1907 and 1991. 
Hence, in order to project future expenditure and revenue, new entries in the 
labour market from 2008 onwards and new births after 1991 need to be added 
to the model. To add the new-borns, we compare the number of people in the 
2007 population and in the 2007 MCVL wave and take into account official 
population projections (Spanish National Institute of Statistics, INE, 2014). 
Once entered in the sample, agents experience several events. The data 
employed to simulate each of the events are described below. The first step is 
to assign a level of education, but while the MCVL contains information about 
                                                         
6 For a detailed description of the MCVL see MTAS (2006). Pérez-Salamero et al., (2017) 
undertook an evaluation of the representativeness of the MCVL. 
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individuals’ education, this variable is collected from a different data set that is 
not updated very frequently. As a result, the level of education is frequently 
missing or underestimated. For individuals registered in the MCVL, we retain 
the value as reported and correct it upwards in cases where there is an 
inconsistency between the value of education and the contribution group.7 For 
“future” individuals, born from 1991 onwards, the final level of education is 
assigned randomly so as to reproduce the educational distribution reported for 
the Spanish population by MEC (2010)8. According to this publication, the level 
of education has risen substantially in recent decades.  
 
In a second step, once the main characteristics of the individuals are assigned 
and they reach the age of 16, they are exposed to the probability of entering the 
labour market by age, gender, education and initial qualification level. This 
probability is obtained from the observation of the entry path of the last cohort, 
which has completed its incorporation into the labour market – those aged 36-
40 in 2007. 
 
In a third step, having entered the labour market, individuals are exposed to 
labour market transitions. The hazards observed are extracted from the 2007 
wave of the MCVL. Specifically, transitions between qualification levels within 
employment and transitions between employment and unemployment are 
obtained by age, gender and qualification level when necessary. To this effect, 
the 13 contribution groups in the general regime of the Spanish Social Security 
are classed in just five groups – that is, those subject to the same contribution 
limits (thresholds). As the transition hazards among the different qualification 
levels are quite stable during the observed period (2002-2007), the value of the 
last transition observed before the economic crisis (2006 to 2007) is taken, and 
it is held constant for the future, except for the fact that they are temporarily 
adjusted to reproduce the crisis period (see Appendix 3 for details about the how 
the crisis period is considered in our simulation).9  
 
The demographic and macroeconomic assumptions employed in our simulation 
are summarized in Table 1 and compared to those used by the Ageing Working 
Group of the European Commission in the last long-term projections of pension 
expenditure in the EU (European Commission, 2015a), hereafter AWG15. The 
differences in the projection mechanisms employed in both cases are also 
detailed.  
                                                         
7 This can only be done for the first contribution group (University level).  
8https://www.educacion.gob.es/educabase/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=/Formacionyml/EPA2
015/NivFor&file=pcaxis&l=s0 
9 Specifically, the unemployment and reemployment hazards are adjusted using observed trends 
as reported in FEDEA (Observatorio Laboral de la Crisis). It is beyond the scope of the present 
paper to report a detailed analysis of the impact of the crisis on the unemployment transitions. 
See Bentolila et al. (2017) for an analysis of changes in long-term unemployment during the 
crisis. 
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Table 1 Demographic and macroeconomic assumptions 
 AWG15 DyPeS 
 
 
 
 
 
Demographic 
assumptions 
 
EUROSTAT (EUROPOP 2013):  
 
Fertility (children per women):  
Starts at 1.3 and increases 
gradually to 1.55 in 2060.   
 
Life expectancy at birth: 
90.0 Female  
85.5 Male 
 
Migration:  
- 311.000 net immigrants in 2013  
+275.000 net immigrants in 2060 
 
INE (2014-2064): 
 
Fertility (children per women): 
Starts at 1.27 and remains practically 
constant (1.22 by 2060) 
 
Life expectancy at birth: 
90.8 Female  
86.9 Male 
 
Migration: 
No future migration explicitly 
modelled 
 
 
 
Wage and 
productivity 
growth 
 
Productivity growth:  
Starting from observed values it 
declines to 0.7 in 2020 and tends 
to 1.5 after 2030. 
 
 
 
Productivity growth: 
Observed values for 2008-2015. 
Future values from the AWG15.  
 
Wages: 
A wage model estimates real wage as a 
share of average wage for each age, 
gender and education level, 
controlling for several variables.  
 
 
 
Inflation 
 
 
 
2013-2017: reaching 2% in 2018 
from initial value 
2018-2060: 2% 
 
2008-2016: observed values (INE) 
2017-2020: 1.4 * 
2021-2055: 2.0 *  
 
* Taken from Hernández de Cos et al. (2017) 
 
 
Labor 
market 
 
Projection of participation and 
employment rates by age, gender 
and year elaborated on purpose 
(values in Table 1b) 
 
 
Observed pre-crisis employment and 
reemployment hazards by age, gender 
and qualification group are kept 
constant, except for the adjustment 
during the crisis (see Appendix A.2). 
The resulting values are shown in 
Table 2. 
 
 
 
The first row focuses on demographics. Our simulation starts from the 
demographic projections developed by INE (2014-2064), though we deviate 
from these to some extent. First, as mentioned above, the number of future new-
borns introduced in the model is obtained from INE’s population projections, 
adapting it to the size of the sample according to its representativeness. Hence, 
population age structure should be similar in both models, despite the fact that 
we do not model the entries and exits of migrants separately. Fertility 
assumptions are also in line with those of the INE (2014-2064). Second, the age 
and gender specific mortality rates employed in the model are those assumed by 
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INE. Regarding migration, the assumptions taken in AWG15 indicate the 
difficulties in obtaining reliable assumptions about its future evolution. The 
crisis dramatically changed migration trends, especially in Spain where 
migration started late but ended quite abruptly. Hence, in this exercise we 
choose to avoid an explicit analysis of migration. We discuss the impact of this 
omission in the results section. 
 
The second row presents the productivity growth assumptions and how they are 
translated into wage growth in the microsimulation model. The AWG15 
assumes a productivity growth rate starting from the observed values and 
tending to an annual 1.5% from 2030 onwards. The inflation assumption is 
shown in the third row. The AWG15 does not make this assumption explicit in 
its document. In our case, we borrow the inflation assumption from Hernández 
de Cos et al. (2017). Starting from the observed values – some of which are 
negative – it increases to 1.4% for the period 2017-20 and 2% from 2021 
onwards. 
 
Finally, in the case of the labour market, while the AWG15 uses a projection 
designed for that purpose, in DyPeS it is more a result of the model. Specifically, 
as explained above, the initial transition rates observed for unemployment and 
reemployment are kept constant, except during the crisis period. Table 2 
compares the participation rates by gender obtained in both cases, which prove 
to be quite similar. 
 
Table 2 Labour market evolution: average participation rates (16-64) 
    2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 
Female 
AWG15 68.4 73.5 77.2 79.3 78.9 78.4 
DyPeS 64.1 74.6 73.3 72.8 73.7 72.9 
Male 
AWG15 79.9 79.5 79.2 79.9 80.1 79.3 
DyPeS 73.0 78.0 75.5 73.0 74.6 74.8 
 
 
 
5. Results: The effects of the 2013 reform on pension sustainability and 
adequacy 
 
This section presents and discusses the effects of the reform of the Spanish 
retirement pension system enacted in 2013. Those effects are captured via the 
extension of the DyPeS microsimulation model. Different scenarios are defined 
in the simulation. First, the baseline is defined as the pre-reform situation, taking 
into account the leading measures introduced in the past, including the reform 
measures introduced in 2011 (see Appendix 1 for details). Second, the reform 
scenario considers the legal configuration of the adjustment factors enacted in 
2013, both the pension revaluation index, UI, introduced in 2014 and the 
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sustainability factor, SF, linking the entry pension to eventual increases in life 
expectancy which was to be applied from 2019 onwards. It is important to note 
that our simulations only refer to retirement pensions, leaving aside the rest of 
contributory pensions (disability and survivor pensions), which are also affected 
by the UI. In addition, no other financing sources than contributions are 
considered when estimating the UI in the simulations. Hence, our results might 
be overestimating to some extent the adjustment needed. 
 
Finally, an alternative scenario is considered by eliminating the upper and lower 
thresholds legally imposed on the application of the UI. The following 
subsections show, first, the evolution of the sustainability indicators, compared 
to those reported in the Ageing Report for 2015 (Subsection 5.1) and, second, 
the evolution of the adequacy measures in different scenarios (Subsection 5.2).  
 
5.1. The impact on sustainability  
 
We start by analysing the overall performance of the microsimulation model in 
demographic and macroeconomic terms. The benchmarks for comparison are 
the values obtained from official data for the period 2008-2015 (the model starts 
its projections in 2008) and the results of the 2015 Ageing Report by the AWG 
(European Commission, 2015a) for the future. 10 A well-known and widely used 
decomposition of total pension expenditure to GDP expresses this as the product 
of four elements: 1) The old dependency rate (ratio between the population aged 
65 and over to the population aged 16-64); 2) The coverage rate (the number of 
retirement pensioners in relation to the population over the age of 65); 3) The 
replacement rate (defined as the ratio of the average pension to average 
productivity); and, finally, 4) The labour market performance (defined as the 
inverse of the employment rate, that is, the working age population divided by 
the number of workers). By so doing, increases in the first three factors 
contribute to raising the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP, while higher 
employment rates reduce this ratio. Following the same logic as that employed 
in the aforementioned decomposition, here we obtain a slightly different 
decomposition that is adapted to the characteristics of our microsimulation 
exercise. As our model does not project GDP, we decompose the ratio of total 
pension expenditure to the total wage bill, also into four components, where the 
first two (the old dependency rate and the coverage rate) are the same as 1) and 
2) above. However, instead of the replacement rate defined above, we obtain 
the ratio between the average pension and the average wage, which we refer to 
as the benefit ratio. Finally, the inverse of the employment rate is measured here 
by dividing the working age population by the number of contributors (our 
proxy of the number of workers).  
                                                         
10  Demographic data and pension information are obtained from the National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) and the Spanish Social Security, respectively. 
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Table 3 summarizes the projected values obtained for these four elements, 
which, in turn, determine the sustainability of the system. To the extent that our 
model explicitly models labour market income and its effect on the initial 
retirement pension at the micro level, it is a useful instrument for relating labour 
market performance to the ageing process, while at the same time allowing us 
to analyse adequacy. This analysis is of particular interest because the UI 
formula introduced by the 2013 reform relates retirement benefits to the Social 
Security balance, which implicitly means linking pension levels to wage growth, 
the main source of social security revenues.  
 
 
Table 3 Demographic and macroeconomic indicators. Projections obtained 
from simulations.  
 
(1) 
Old 
depend. 
Ratio 
(2) 
Coverage 
ratio 
(Baseline) 
(2') 
Coverage 
ratio 
(Reform) 
(3) 
Benefit 
ratio 
(Baseline) 
(3') 
Benefit 
ratio  
(Reform) 
(4) 
Labour 
market 
factor 
(5) Pension 
expend. / 
wage bill  
(Baseline) 
(5') Pension 
expend. / 
wage bill 
(Reform) 
2013 23.1% 65.0% 66.6% 55.2% 55.5% 138% 11.50% 11.84% 
2020 20.9% 68.2% 70.5% 64.0% 60.7% 125% 11.42% 11.19% 
2030 26.2% 73.0% 75.0% 60.5% 50.5% 124% 14.37% 12.33% 
2040 44.7% 91.2% 90.1% 55.1% 42.2% 129% 29.02% 21.95% 
2050 66.9% 90.8% 87.9% 53.9% 37.2% 124% 40.63% 27.15% 
2060 61.9% 88.4% 87.7% 50.3% 34.6% 124% 33.97% 23.21% 
Notes: (i) The old-age of reference used for calculations (old-dependency rate, coverage ratio 
and labour market factor) is 65. (ii) After the initial period, the denominator in the coverage 
ratio only considers people aged 65+ who participated in labour market.  (iii) The labour market 
factor is the inverse of the employment rate (population aged 16-64 / contributors). (iv) Average 
wages used for computing the benefit ratio are average annual wages per full-time equivalent 
employee. (v) As explained in the text 5 = 1·2·3·4 (or 5’=1·2’·3’·4).   
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Column 1 shows the evolution of the old dependency rate, which presents a 
similar evolution, albeit with a more pronounced increase, to that outlined in the 
2015 Ageing Report. Our model reports a value of 66.9% by 2050, compared 
to 62% in the Ageing Report, reflecting primarily a lower fertility rate and 
different migration assumptions (see Section 4). The evolution of this ratio is 
coherent with that of demographic projections, i.e., with the first wave of baby 
boomers reaching the age of 65 in 2022. 
 
The coverage ratio of retirement pensions, shown in Column 2, increases in the 
first years of the projection. This is due primarily to the fact that baby boomer 
females retire with greater pension entitlements than those from the preceding 
cohorts, given their higher participation rates. The initial value for 2013 (c. 
66%) is coherent with that obtained when merging data on population and 
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pensions from official sources. 11  In this case, the values are not readily 
comparable with those reported in the Ageing Report, including public pensions 
of all kinds and all ages (not only retirement pensions). Using the reported 
number of pensioners aged 65 and more, the coverage ratio for this age group 
can be derived.  Specifically, it rises from 84.4% in 2013 to reach 90.4% in 2060. 
Nevertheless, this figure is not yet fully comparable to our estimation as it 
includes all kind of pensions for those older than 65 (a significant share being 
widower pensions). In our case, the increase of the coverage ratio for only 
retirement pensions is higher (from 66.6 to 87.7%).  The increase is overstated 
because the denominator only considers people aged 65+ who participated in 
labour market. The non-participants are not present in the initial MCVL sample, 
although they are added to reproduce the initial dependency ratio. However, 
along the simulation we cannot keep track of their gradual evolution and hence, 
the denominator (population aged 65+) is understated. Our initial value for the 
benefit ratio in 2013 (55.2%) is coherent with that reported in official sources 
(52%).12 The 2015 Ageing Report projects a decrease in the benefit ratio (for all 
pensions) of around 20 percentage points, similar to our projections (20.9 
percentage points). Insofar as our microsimulation model projects future 
pensions in relation to the past evolution of wages, it should capture better all 
the factors that might affect the future evolution of the benefit ratio. As we see 
below (see comments to Figure 6), the interplay between the past evolution of 
wages and pensions in Spain has non-trivial implications for sustainability.   
 
Finally, the initial value for the labour market factor obtained in our simulation 
is similar to that stated by the 2015 Ageing Report, which assumes employment 
rates close to 78%. The future evolution is also very similar, reaching values of 
85 (2015 Ageing Report) and 81% (our projections). Overall, therefore, we can 
conclude that our model is able to replicate long-run trends in terms of both 
demographic and labour market conditions.   
 
Our results are also in line with those obtained in other analysis, although they 
are not fully comparable because of the different methodologies employed. 
Hernández de Cos et al. (2017) undertake an illustrative exercise deriving 
alternative future scenarios of the main components of the pension expenditure 
shown in Table 3. Their simulations extrapolate past trends, considering also 
future foreseeable changes as the increase in old-age dependency. Conde-Ruiz 
and González (2013) develop an accounting model with heterogeneous agents 
and overlapping generations. Sánchez-Martín (2014 and 2017) and Díaz-
Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2017) employ a general equilibrium overlapping 
generations model (OLG) with endogenous retirement age. Leaving aside 
                                                         
11 For example, in 2013, the population older than 64 stood at 8.34 million (National Institute 
of Statistics, INE), and the number of pensioners at 5.52 million (Spanish Social Security), 
giving a coverage ratio of 66% (INE).  
12 The Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE) reports a yearly average wage of 22,698 
euros, and the Social Security reports an average pension of 11,861 euros. 
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demographic evolution, which is taken as given by all the studies, differences 
remain in the other factors. The OLG models do not permit to grasp the 
evolution of the labour market factor easily. In fact, they both obtain a UI above 
the minimum threshold for several years before the retirement of the baby 
boomers, probably due to the fact that they cannot capture the effect of the 
current crisis. Nevertheless, the UI has actually been in the minimum threshold 
since 2014. Sánchez (2014) found a negligible impact in the employment rate 
and a very small one in the pension coverage rate. Hernández de Cos et al. 
(2017) show a scenario including an implicit increase in the coverage ratio.13 
Overall, all of them obtain that the main effect of the 2013 reform will be a 
reduction in the benefit ratio. For example, Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra 
(2017) report a decrease around 60% (54% in our case). 
 
To better understand the projections obtained in our simulation, the evolution 
of the different variables affecting pension expenditure is described below in 
detail. First, Figure 1 shows that the changes in the number of entry pensions 
associated with the 2013 reform. Panel a) reports the evolution of the number 
of entry pensions, showing the effects of the retirement of baby boomers. The 
effect of the reform can be seen in Panel b) showing changes in new entries 
regarding the baseline in the different scenarios. As observed, the effect of the 
reform is significant along the first part of the projection period. It is, in fact, 
related entirely to the introduction of the sustainability factor (SF) described in 
Equation [3] – while the UI (Equation [2]) does not affect entry pensions. The 
introduction of the SF could induce workers to retire earlier to avoid further cuts 
in their pensions due to their higher life expectancy, although some workers 
might seek to extend their labour participation to obtain pension improvements 
from the application of the Bismarckian pension formula. It should be stressed 
at this point that the 2013 reform did not seek to delay retirement, primarily 
because a reform with this exact objective was promulgated two years earlier in 
2011.  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
These results seem to confirm the findings of the 2015 Adequacy Report 
(European Commission, 2015b), namely, that people fail to react to financial 
incentives to delay pension take-up in line with developments in life expectancy. 
And this is not (solely) because people’s behaviour is not entirely rational when 
opting to retire. The behavioural model embedded in DyPeS supposes that 
individuals do behave rationally. However, in a future context in which pensions 
are set to grow at a permanently low rate (the expectation is that the UI will be 
                                                         
13 This study does not provide explicitly the coverage rate, but the product of the dependency 
and the coverage ratios. However, it is possible to estimate it using the dependency ratios 
provided by the Ageing Working Group. This way, given the dependency ratio for 2016 (28.8%) 
the coverage rate is 107%; for 2050 the dependency is 62%, implying a coverage of 117%. 
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fixed in the lower band), the mechanism for updating pensions remains neutral 
to the decision of when to retire.  
    
Figure 2 here 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the average retirement pension level. First, it is 
interesting to examine the impact of the SF (without the UI), which has a 
sizeable impact. Second, we observe that the total cut in pensions introduced by 
the 2013 reform (reaching almost 35% in nominal terms) is quite substantial; 
yet, it is much less than the reduction that would have resulted from a scenario 
with a non-limited UI. As explained above, Law 23/2013 of 23 December 
regulating the sustainability factor and the annual revaluation index of Social 
Security pensions established that, regardless of the result of applying the 
formula (Eq. 2) to obtain the UI, the revaluation of Social Security contributory 
pensions should not be less than a minimum annual percentage (0.25%) nor 
exceed a maximum rate (evolution of the Consumer Price Index in the previous 
year + 0.50%). Notoriously, the results of our simulation for the scenario in 
which the 2013 reform is fully implemented with thresholds indicate that the UI 
will be fixed in the lower band of 0.25% during the whole period of analysis 
(2015-2055). The scenario that considers the implementation of the UI without 
thresholds, produces UI values close to -2% for 2015 and 2016, which is 
coherent with other estimations (AIREF, 2014). 
 
Figure 3 here  
 
Finally, Figure 3 summarizes the overall effect of the reform by showing the 
evolution of the ratio between pension expenditure and the wage bill. The model 
predicts a decrease of almost 15 percentage points of this ratio following the 
introduction of the 2013 reform. And this decrease is magnified once again by 
the scenario with no limits. This ratio is not fully comparable to that between 
pension expenditure and GDP calculated in the Ageing Report (2015), but it is 
sufficiently informative of the extent of the effects. 
 
In short, it can be concluded that the main objective of the reform – a reduction 
in future public expenditure on pensions – is achieved, at least to quite a 
considerable degree. The next section analyses whether the adequacy effects of 
the reform allow for an equally positive interpretation. 
 
 
 
5.2 The impact on adequacy 
 
There is no broad consensus in the academic literature and within policymaking 
circles as to what constitutes the best measure of pension adequacy. Moreover, 
a review of recent reports, including the Adequacy Report of the European 
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Commission (European Commission, 2015b), suggests that the concept of 
adequacy is in fact a compilation of various objectives: that is, not only securing 
a minimum standard of living for the elderly (the “strict” definition of 
adequacy), but also achieving distributional and equity objectives (in both inter- 
and intra-generational terms). It should be stressed, however, that protecting the 
elderly from the risk of poverty and depravation is compatible with an income 
distribution that improves the position of those that are worst off. Consequently, 
no single measure appears to offer a clear indication of the extent to which the 
reforms impact on the achievement of these pension system goals.  
 
To analyse the intergenerational equity effects of the reform enacted in 2013, in 
line with the aforementioned report (European Commission, 2015b), we focus 
primarily on the relative distribution between workers and pensioners, paying 
specific attention to two dimensions of analysis. First, we investigate the relative 
position of the elderly with respect to the working-age population (simultaneous 
comparison of two cohorts). Second, the projection model allows us to monitor 
the future evolution of their relative positions, providing a complementary 
picture of intergenerational equity insofar as it reflects the position of future 
generations at the time of retirement (comparison of two cohorts at different 
times). Specifically, we compute two indicators of intergenerational equity: the 
benefit ratio and the relative median income ratio. The former can be computed 
in aggregate accounting models based on representative age cohorts, while the 
latter – and more detailed measures of income redistribution – can only be 
obtained in the framework of microsimulation.  
 
As stated above, the benefit ratio is defined as the average pension benefit 
relative to the average wage. It provides an estimate of the overall generosity of 
a pension system, measuring its income replacement capacity. At the same time, 
it also provides information about the relative economic position of workers and 
pensioners. In this sense, the benefit ratio represents the broadest of measures, 
since it compares all (public) pension payments with economy-wide incomes, 
whereas other indicators are narrower in their approach. For example, the 
aggregate replacement ratio, used in the Adequacy Report (European 
Commission, 2015b), only compares the pension income of those aged 65-74 
with the earnings of people aged 50-59. 
 
Figure 4 presents the benefit ratio obtained under the three alternative scenarios 
(the baseline without the reform; the reform implemented in 2013; and, a 
hypothetical scenario applying the UI without thresholds). Interestingly, the 
application of the 2013 reform causes the benefit ratio to decrease substantially. 
The baseline scenario initially presents an increase followed by a decrease after 
2025, reflecting the gradual effects of the reform implemented in 2011. It is 
worth mentioning that the scenario in which the thresholds of the revaluation 
index are eliminated (in particular, the minimum threshold) leads to a 
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significantly greater reduction in the benefit ratio, highlighting the huge 
potential impact of this reform in terms of adequacy.  
 
Figure 4 here  
 
Figure 5 shows the relative median income of pensioners regarding workers. 
The relative median income ratio is calculated as the median income of people 
aged 65 (the median pension) as a share of the median income of people aged 
16-64 (median wage).14 The expected evolution of this ratio is quite similar to 
that obtained for the benefit ratio. An increase is observed during the initial 
projection period (in all scenarios) that might reflect the fact that workers are 
subject to labour market instability (attributable to the economic crisis), while 
pensioners are no longer subject to these effects. This situation is best captured 
by the median income ratio, which has greater explanatory power in terms of 
inequality. Note, however that this ratio does not fall in the baseline scenario, 
as it does in the case of the benefit ratio. 
  
Figure 5 here 
 
Overall, both indicators ‒ the benefit ratio and the median income ratio ‒ present 
similar patterns. The impact on adequacy ‒ as on sustainability ‒ of the 
sustainability factor and the pension revaluation index introduced in the 2013 
reform are significant, while a hypothetical elimination of the minimum 
threshold for the revaluation index would be devastating. Figure 6 gives 
interesting insights in this respect. It shows the past evolution of wages and 
pensions, together with the future expected trends under the different scenarios. 
Note that the effects of the economic crisis, which initiated in 2008, caused a 
fall in pension growth, but above all in wage growth. From 2012 onwards (the 
worst year in terms of unemployment rates and other macro indicators), the 
progressive economic recovery saw wage growth recover positive values, while 
pension growth was restricted by the reform.  
 
 
Figure 6 here  
 
Figure 6 shows that over recent decades, the average retirement pension in Spain 
has grown significantly more than wages (benefit ratio increases), but this trend 
is set to be reversed in the future. Even in a hypothetical baseline scenario 
without the 2013 reform, average wage growth would surpass that of pensions 
after 2025. The reform stops radically the increase in the benefit ratio and 
reduces it bellow pre-crisis level. Finally, the hypothetical application of the UI 
                                                         
14  The 2015 Adequacy Report constructs this ratio by comparing the median equivalised 
disposable income of people aged 65 and more and those aged 0-64, including all sources of 
income, not only pensions and wages. 
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without thresholds (which is negative for most of the period) reinforces this 
process producing a more than 50% cut in the benefit ratio. Wages grow far 
above pensions. First, productivity growth is not translated fully into pensions 
growth (it only affects entry pensions). Second, pensions do not grow with 
inflation any more, since the introduction of UI in the 2013 reform. As a result, 
the benefit ratio deteriorates dramatically. This trend depends on productivity 
growth as shown in the sensitivity scenarios (Appendix 4) 
 
In other words, by conditioning retirement benefits to the social security balance, 
the reform links pension levels to wage growth (that is, to the main source of 
social security revenues). Thus, the relationship between pensions and wage 
growth is implicitly “sustainable” (a sustainable benefit ratio): increasing gains 
in retirement benefits due to higher wages are only maintained when the growth 
in pensions does not compromise the social security budget. 
 
To complete the analysis of intergenerational equity, the expected evolution of 
the risk of poverty among pensioners is plotted in Figure 8. The risk of poverty 
is defined as the situation in which a pensioner receives a pension below that of 
the median income of the economy (plotted in Figure 7).15 The implementation 
of the 2013 reform is set to increase the risk of poverty among pensioners in the 
future, since it results in lower pension growth and, consequently, worsens the 
relative position of pensioners with regard to workers. Overall, the share of 
pensioners with income below that of the median will increase up to around 15 
percentage points from 2013 onwards. This picture deteriorates markedly in the 
scenario in which the UI is applied without thresholds. In this case, the share of 
pensioners with an income below the median would be significantly higher, 
even approaching 100% throughout the decade of the 2030s. 
 
 
Figure 7 here 
 
 
Figure 8 here 
 
 
The microsimulation nature of our model also allows us to analyse equity from 
an intragenerational perspective. Figure 8 shows the expected evolution of the 
S80/S20 pensions ratio under the different scenarios. The S80/S20 indicator is 
a widely used indicator for measuring inequality and is included in the Joint 
Assessment Framework (JAF), as well as in the Social EMU scoreboard on key 
social and employment indicators. It is obtained as the ratio between the total 
income received by the 20% of the population with the highest income (the top 
                                                         
15  In our microsimulation exercise, the median income is computed with the distribution of 
wages and pensions, as other income sources are not included in the model. 
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quintile) and that received by the 20% of the population with the lowest (the 
bottom quintile). In our exercise, we compute the S80/S20 for retirement 
pensions, that is, we obtain an indicator of distribution among pensioners based 
solely on pension income. Interestingly, Figure 8 shows that, in the medium 
term, the 2013 reform increases inequality among pensioners, while this effect 
is eliminated in the long-term (from the late 2030s onwards). In contrast, in the 
hypothetical scenario in which the UI is applied without thresholds, equality 
would increase among pensioners. The explanation is quite simple: inequality 
would improve at the expense of a general decrease in pensions (as shown 
previously in Figure 6), which means pensioners would be more equal, but 
poorer.  
 
Figure 9 here  
 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Concerns about the consequences of demographic ageing on the sustainability 
of the pension system have led to the adoption of reforms to reduce pension 
expenditure. However, the impact of these reforms on pension adequacy has 
frequently been overlooked. In this paper, we have used an extended version of 
the DyPeS microsimulation model to assess the impact of the last major reform 
of the Spanish retirement pension system, implemented in 2013, introducing a 
new revaluation index to update pensions linked to the budget balance of the 
Social Security, and a sustainability factor adjusting the initial pension 
according to changes in life expectancy. The model is designed to facilitate 
analysis of the effects both on pension sustainability and adequacy, providing 
indicators of both inter and intragenerational distribution. 
 
In line with previous studies, our results show that the reform implemented in 
2013 represents a major step towards sustainability, although it has yet to be 
fully achieved. Our simulations project a significant reduction in total 
expenditure on retirement pensions thanks to the reform. The ratio between total 
expenditure (on retirement pensions) and the total wage bill is projected as being 
reduced by around 14 percentage points by 2050; even though it would still 
double the current figure (29.5 vs. 14.6%). An examination of the four factors 
that this ratio can be broken down into presents the expected trends. The 
coverage rate and, specially, the old dependency rate are set to increase 
significantly. While the latter is mainly driven by demographic assumptions, the 
increase in the coverage rate basically responds to the gradually progressive 
access of women to retirement pensions. In contrast, the expected evolution of 
the other two factors, that is, the benefit ratio and the employment rate, presents 
a reduction in the ration between pension expenditure and the wage bill, 
although it will be insufficient to offset the increase created by the coverage and 
the old dependency ratios. It is worth stressing that the benefit ratio is the factor 
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most strongly affected by the reform. Interestingly, the introduction of the 
sustainability factor and the annual revaluation index both stops and reverses 
the trend observed over the last two decades during which pensions have grown 
at a faster rate than wages. By 2050, the average pension will represent below 
40% of the average wage, as opposed to the current value of 55%, while in a 
hypothetical scenario without reform, it would stand at around 54%.   
 
At the same time, the introduction of the sustainability factor and the annual 
revaluation index in the Spanish pension system is set to have important effects 
in terms of adequacy, which are also worthy of our attention. The gains in 
sustainability are mainly driven by the significant fall in the benefit ratio 
(average pension to average wage), which implies that the relative economic 
position of pensioners will deteriorate continuously throughout forthcoming 
decades, in contrast to the situation experienced in past decades. As a result, our 
simulations show that from 2030 onwards the percentage of pensioners 
receiving earnings below the median income will be close to 80%, while this 
figure is less than 65% in the scenario without reform. This trend would be 
strengthened in a hypothetical scenario in which the UI was applied without 
thresholds, so that the benefit ratio would fall even more dramatically and the 
percentage share of pensioners with an income below the median would be close 
to 100%. Interestingly, if we examine the intragenerational redistribution 
among pensioners, the effects are far from straightforward. The S80/S20 ratio, 
comparing the pensions received by the highest and the lowest quintiles in the 
distribution, increases slightly up to 2030, indicating that equity among 
pensioners deteriorates with the introduction of the sustainability factor and the 
pension revaluation index. However, the results in the hypothetical scenario in 
which the UI is applied without thresholds show a clear improvement of the 
intragenerational distribution across the whole projection. In this latter case, as 
the average pension would fall significantly, equity would improve at the 
expense of poverty: pensioners would be more equal but markedly poorer. 
 
In short, our results indicate that although pension reforms are designed 
primarily to foster sustainability, they also have significant effects on adequacy, 
an impact that deserves closer scrutiny. Indeed, the design of the distributive 
effects of pension systems clearly requires further investigation. Besides the 
preference for redistributive (Beveridgean) or non-redistributive (Bismarckian) 
pensions, the life-cycle nature of pension insurance and the need to cope with 
demographic ageing complicate the picture further insofar as they potentially 
have unpredicted redistributive effects. Overall, further research is required in 
order to investigate the redistributive effects of pensions from a lifetime 
perspective and in relation to other social programs.   
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 Evolution of entry pensions  
a) Number of new pensioners (*)        b) Changes in the number of new pensioners  
           (regarding baseline) 
 
(*) Results refer to the size of the MCVL, representing around a 4% of the reference population  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 2 Average retirement pension level (nominal euros per year) 
 
Note: Calculations refer to the average retirement pension of all the Social Security regimes 
excluding self-employed. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 3 Retirement pension expenditure to total wage bill  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Figure 4 Benefit ratio (average retirement pension to average wage) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 5 Median income of pensioners (aged 65 or older) as a share of the 
median wage of people aged 16-64. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Figure 6 Annual average growth of wages and pensions, 1995-2055 
 
Note: Nominal growth rates.  
Source: Observed data from 1995 to 2015 (Annual Economic Data Base of the European 
Commission and Spanish Social Security). Data from 2016 onwards are projected by the authors. 
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Figure 7 Median income (nominal euros per year) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Figure 8 Percentage of pensioners in risk of poverty (below median 
income) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 9 S80/S20 pensions ratio  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Appendix 1. A summary of the main reforms of the contributory 
retirement pensions system prior to 2013 
 
Without seeking to be exhaustive, we present a chronological summary of the 
main reforms affecting retirement pensions in Spain’s Social Security system. 
The present system was introduced in 1967 with the enactment of the General 
Social Security Law. The system is contributory, insofar as the retirement 
pension relies on the fact that the initial pension benefit is dependent, to some 
degree, on the worker’s past contributions, although the worker must have 
completed a minimum period of contributions. Specifically, the initial pension 
(IP) is determined by applying a percentage (p) which, in turn, depends on the 
contribution period (n) to the regulatory base [RB] (defined as the average 
contribution base in the past). Moreover, various correction coefficients (c) may 
also apply in certain circumstances (such as delayed or early retirement): 
 
IP = RB · p(n) · (1-c) 
 
The first major reform of the Social Security was made in 1985, when the 
minimum period of contributions for receiving a pension was increased from 10 
to 15 years, and the period for calculating the RB was also increased from 2 to 
8 years. Both measures sought to reduce expenditure by limiting access and by 
reducing benefits through the extension of the period to calculate the regulatory 
base. Moreover, an explicit actualization mechanism (annual) for existing 
pensions was introduced, taking into account the predicted rate of inflation for 
the next year.  
 
In 1995, all political parties signed the Toledo Pact, following the setting up of 
a special Parliamentary commission whose remit was to analyse the pension 
system and make recommendations about possible reforms. The Pact identified 
the need to reinforce the contributory nature of the system, separate the 
financing of the non-contributory pensions from that of the Social Security, 
promote delayed (voluntary) retirement, guarantee the purchasing power of 
pensions over time and create a reserve fund with eventual surpluses to be used 
in the future. Some of these recommendations were implemented in the 1997 
reform. In order to strengthen its contributory nature, the components of the 
formula for calculating the IP were again modified. Specifically, the years for 
computing the RB were increased from 8 to 15 and the percentages was 
modified as follows: the first 15 years of contribution gave the right to 50% of 
the RB (60% before the reform) as initial pension benefit. Each additional year 
up to 25 increased the pension by 3 percentage points, and each additional year 
between 26 and 35 increased the pension by 2 percentage points (prior to the 
reform, each additional year between 16 and 35 years increased the pension by 
2 percentage points). In this way, after 35 years of contributions individuals 
reach 100% of the RB as before, but with a different distribution in favour of 
longer working careers. Any improvement in the contributory nature of the 
36 
 
system was, however, modest. 1 The 1997 Reform also introduced (albeit in a 
somewhat vague fashion) the creation of a Social Security reserve fund with 
eventual surpluses, and the possibility of measures to promote delayed 
retirement. In 2002, a new Law enacted more specific measures to encourage 
delayed retirement and to discourage partial retirement.  
 
In 2007, changes were once again made in retirement pensions. The conditions 
for accessing partial retirement were further tightened, while the premium 
coefficient (c) applied to delayed retirement was increased. The next major 
Social Security reform in Spain was implemented by means of Law 27/2011.2 
In the middle of a deep economic crisis, the government decided to undertake 
far-reaching reforms in order to reduce expenditure and avoid short-term 
financial deficits caused by the dramatic fall in contributions. Among the 
measures introduced, mention should be made of the extension of the ordinary 
retirement age from 65 to 67 (although it remained at 65 for individuals with 
long working careers, accrediting 38.5 or more years of contribution). To 
strengthen the contributory nature, both components of the formula for 
calculating the initial pension were again modified – the period of past 
contributions considered in obtaining the RB was increased from 15 to 25 years, 
while the percentage to apply to the RB was also modified for individuals with 
more than 15 years of contributions (being extended from 35 to 37 years and 
being made more proportional). The possibility of early retirement was also 
modified by introducing two paths of access (voluntary and involuntary) for 
those with long contribution histories. A lengthy period of transition (2013-
2027) was established before all these measures were fully adopted.   
 
 
                                                         
1  Jimeno (2003) performed an interesting simulation analysis of the intragenerational 
distribution effects of the Spanish pension retirement system in relation to other countries. He 
founds that some characteristics of the Spanish system, as using a short period ‒ 15 years ‒ to 
calculate the regulatory base, caused more inequality.  
2  See Conde-García and González (2013) for a detailed description of this reform and an 
analysis of its effects. 
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Appendix 2. Modelling wages and the retirement decision 
 
The DyPeS model enables us to project the effects of the labour market on the 
pension system, because productivity growth at the macro level is linked to 
individual wage growth and, hence, to the entry pension level, affecting in turn 
the retirement decision. It achieves this by means of two principal mechanisms: 
the wage growth model and the retirement decision model.  
 
The wage model is based on the traditional Mincer equation, and is estimated 
separately by gender and education group: 
 
For period t                                                                              
            
                                                                                                     [A2.1] 
 
 
where 
itw is the yearly wage of individual i, tw  is the average wage of the 
economy and β0, β1 and α are the parameters of interest that we wish to estimate. 
The set of explanatory variables,
iX  includes, apart from the previous wage 
( 1itw ), age, age squared and business cycle indicators – unemployment rate. 
 
Thus, using the following coefficients: 
 
[A2.2] 
 
and applying the productivity growth rate assumed in each scenario to the 
average wage of the economy ( 1itw ), we obtain the future individual wage for 
the projected periods ( 1t  and the following periods) as: 
                                          
                                                                                                     [A2.3]
                             
 
To estimate the model (Equation [A2.1]), we use a panel data set covering the 
period 2005-2014, which has been drawn up using information from the MCVL 
and from the macroeconomic indicators (Spanish National Institute of Statistics, 
INE). During the simulation, earnings (and contribution bases) are updated on 
a continuous basis. To do so, both a current value and an accumulated value are 
maintained and updated in the following cases. First, earnings are updated at the 
beginning of the year, in accordance with Equation [A2.3]. At the same time, 
contribution bases are also updated. Second, whenever a labour status transition 
occurs – both among contribution groups within employment status, and 
between unemployment and employment statuses, a change in wages is applied 
depending on gender and the original and final states. For this purpose, the 
average change in wage observed is used. Finally, every time one of the 
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aforementioned changes occurs, total earnings (and contribution bases) 
functions are updated. This also happens at the end of the year, so that the annual 
flow of earnings and contribution bases can be recovered and stored. 
 
The estimation results of the wage growth model are shown in Table A2.1. As 
expected, wages increase with age, but non-linearly. In the case of men, the 
positive impact of age on wages is more than twice the impact recorded on 
women. As expected, higher unemployment rates result in a reduction in wage 
growth, and this effect is most marked among men with high levels of education. 
 
Table A2.1 The wage growth model: Results 
 
The retirement model seeks to capture the fact that individuals may change their 
behaviour in response to pension system reforms, modifying their retirement 
decision to optimize their benefits. Indeed, given that retirement choices reflect 
individuals having to weigh up options regarding their present and future 
income, as well as their leisure preferences and risk perceptions, such choices 
can be modelled within the theoretical framework of the life-cycle theory of 
consumption, based on utility maximization. This approach captures the impact 
of changes in the budget constraint on the retirement decision, given an 
individual’s consumption and leisure preferences reflected in the utility function. 
A full structural estimation of this model requires the explicit modelling of all 
these factors, which in turn implies strong parametric assumptions about 
preferences. The approach has the advantage of affording a clear interpretation 
of results, but it poses major challenges of feasibility. In this regard, the seminal 
works of Miller (1984), Wolpin (1984), Pakes (1986) and Rust (1987), 
identified the conditions under which these dynamic discrete choice models 
were both feasible and relevant for solving key economic questions.  
 
We model retirement behaviour by introducing financial incentives within a 
survival framework. In line with previous research for the US (Coile and Gruber, 
Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. t 
Male less than secondary Female less than secondary
Past wage 0.0023 0.0001    26.92 ** Past wage 0.0060 0.0002       33.07 **
Age Sq. 0.0406 0.0007    57.56 ** Age Sq. 0.0012 0.0007       1.83 *
Age Sq. -0.0004 0.0000    -68.08 ** Age Sq. -0.0001 0.0000       -12.37 **
Unemployment rate -0.0391 0.0001    -266.5 ** Unemployment rate -0.0210 0.0001       -158.93 **
Constant 0.1436 0.0204    7.03 ** Constant 0.7583 0.0189       40.09 **
Male secondary Female secondary
Past wage 0.0010 0.0000    22.82 ** Past wage 0.0003 0.0000       8.88 **
Age Sq. 0.1116 0.0008    140.1 ** Age Sq. 0.0570 0.0005       108.19 **
Age Sq. -0.0013 0.0000    -169.9 ** Age Sq. -0.0007 0.0000       -139.47 **
Unemployment rate -0.0484 0.0002    -268.3 ** Unemployment rate -0.0322 0.0001       -274.71 **
Constant -0.8239 0.0202    -40.72 ** Constant -0.0445 0.0130       -3.42 **
Male university Female university
Past wage 0.0073 0.0002    31.28 ** Past wage 0.0030 0.0002       15.74 **
Age Sq. 0.2002 0.0034    58.11 ** Age Sq. 0.1020 0.0016       63.76 **
Age Sq. -0.0024 0.0000    -70.76 ** Age Sq. -0.0013 0.0000       -78.68 **
Unemployment rate -0.0707 0.0007    -95.15 ** Unemployment rate -0.0461 0.0003       -138.36 **
Constant -1.7209 0.0861    -19.98 ** Constant -0.3443 0.0368       -9.35 **
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2000; Baker et al., 2003; Gruber and Wise, 2005), survival estimates highlight 
the role played by the economic incentives for retirement implicit in the pension 
scheme. Specifically, in the reduced-form approach the retirement hazard is 
estimated as a function of individual characteristics (age, education, etc.) and 
retirement incentives. Indeed, reduced-form models, in the form of discrete 
response or hazard models, can be traced back to utility models, as shown by 
Stock and Wise (1990). Changes in income reflect changes in utility (thus 
avoiding the need to model consumption), while preferences for leisure can be 
captured by variables expressing impatience to retire. Including this reduced 
form retirement behavioural equation in our microsimulation model allows us 
to define an ‘optimal time to retire’ scenario coherent with current regulations. 
 
To define the incentives to be included in our model, we take as our starting 
point recent studies for Spain that estimate the effects of Social Security 
incentives and use the same dataset as the one employed herein (i.e., the MCVL). 
Vegas-Sánchez et al. (2013) estimate Social Security Wealth (SSW), i.e., the 
present net value of net benefits received from the pension system; Social 
Security Accrual (SSA), i.e., the discounted change in SSW when postponing 
retirement by one year; and, the Peak Value (PV), which compares this year’s 
SSW with the maximum SSW that can be attained in the future. The authors 
report that the coefficients of all three social security variables are statistically 
significant with the expected sign. However, several studies (based on a 
preliminary experimental version of MCVL) report the limited effect of 
retirement incentives on the retirement decision, suggesting that age is the main 
determinant (Boldrin et al., 2004; Jimenez-Martin, 2006). In this respect, it is 
well known (Gruber and Wise, 2004) that SSW might be endogenous and it may 
not be possible to separate the effects of financial incentives and the taste for 
work – both interacting with age. More recently, García-Pérez et al. (2013) show 
that, when incentives are properly defined and problems such as individual 
heterogeneity are taken into account, incentives have a strong impact on labour 
market decisions, especially on retirement decisions. We estimated a similar 
model to the one used in Vegas-Sánchez et al. (2013) and found that the PV has 
no impact on the probability of retirement. Thus, in our microsimulation model, 
we opted to include a set of incentives that are closer to those use in García-
Pérez et al. (2013). The latter authors specify a model that only considers the 
current pension benefits of retirees and changes in their pension rights. We take 
a similar approach by considering pension rights and the difference between the 
expected pension at its highest possible value and the pension if the worker 
retires in the current year. The influence of minimum pensions on low-wage 
workers is also tracked. We also include the replacement rate (initial pension to 
last individual’s wage) and current labour income as a financial incentive, which 
takes the form of wages, for employees, or unemployment benefit, for the 
unemployed.  
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The individual replacement rate and the maximum expected pension are clearly 
related to an individual’s wage trajectory and, also, to the average productivity 
of the economy, in line with the model presented above. These mechanisms 
cause productivity growth to have an impact on both the level and adequacy of 
pensions and, hence, on the average retirement age.  On the one hand, more 
optimistic productivity growth scenarios would lead to higher individual growth 
rates and, consequently, worsen the relative position of the elderly with respect 
to the working population (decreasing median income ratios, for example). On 
the other hand, higher wages mean higher future entry pensions, given that the 
formula calculating initial pensions links them directly to the contributions 
made over the preceding years (15 in 2015 increasing gradually to 25 from 2023 
according to the 2011 reform). Finally, higher wages would lead to a decrease 
in replacement rates, making it more attractive for workers to remain in the 
labour market. This, in turn, would also have a positive impact on initial 
pensions. Consequently, projecting different productivity growth rate scenarios 
(see Appendix 4) can provide interesting information for policy evaluation as 
regards the impact of changes in the retirement age and their interaction with 
labour market performance. Note that the results in this respect are not easily 
predictable without a complete model that links, to some extent, the micro and 
macro levels. 
 
The other variables included in our model (apart from retirement incentives) 
are: level of education, labour status (employed/unemployed), an indicator as to 
whether the individual is a recipient of unemployment benefit, waiting time (and 
age) to obtain the maximum pension, replacement rate, and a time counter that 
seeks to capture impatience. We also include a proxy for the state of the business 
cycle (unemployment rate). We expect financial incentives and variables related 
to taste for work and impatience to interact, as is commonly assumed by 
economic theory: people seek to maximize their income, but they prefer leisure 
to work. The time dimension operates discounting future gains in terms of both 
leisure time and money (people are assumed to be impatient). People aged over 
58 and fulfilling the eligibility conditions compute their retirement hazards 
monthly, and the covariates that determine the retirement decision are also 
updated monthly.  
 
We estimate a piecewise-constant exponential model in which the hazard is 
assumed constant within pre-specified survival time intervals but the constants 
may differ for different intervals. This kind of semi-parametric model is 
commonly used in a continuous time framework – the approach we adopt to 
exploit the richness of our dataset – to avoid assumptions about the shape of the 
hazard function implied by parametric models. Then, the exponential model can 
be defined by:  
 
                                           )exp()(),( 0 tt XtXt                                                  [A2.4]               
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where the baseline hazard rate is constant within each of the k intervals but 
differs between intervals, X is a vector of variables (fixed or, if time-varying, 
constant within each interval) representing personal characteristics, working 
careers and macro-indicators that are relevant for our model, β is the vector of 
parameters we wish to estimate, and t represents time. We use a monthly panel 
dataset covering the period 2005–10, derived from the MCVL. It includes all 
individuals eligible for retirement during this period, excluding those that retired 
due to collective agreements or who were forced to do so by regulation 
(unemployed who reach the minimum retirement age). 
 
Table A2.2 Estimations of the retirement decision. Behavioural model 
  Men  Women 
  
  Haz. Ratio Std. Err.             z   
Haz. 
Ratio 
Std. 
Err. 
z 
  
    
  Age 21.2169 12.1363 5.34 ** 0.8289 0.0198 -7.87 ** 
  Age Sq. 0.976 0.0043 -5.49 ** -     
  Secondary studiesa 0.9727 0.0551 -0.48  0.8574 0.0785 -1.68   
  University studies 1.1521 0.0688 2.37 ** 0.9322 0.1076 -0.61   
  First year retired 11.219 2.2717 11.94 ** 7.2516 3.1661 4.54 ** 
  Unemployed 0.6557 0.0444 -6.22 ** 0.6919 0.0586 -4.35 ** 
  Unemployment benefit  0.1557 0.0906 -3.19 ** 0.2133 0.1248 -2.64 ** 
  Wage (100 € change) 0.9952 0.0001 -13.48 ** 0.9947 0.0006 -8.58 ** 
PV (difference max. pension, 100 
€ change) 
0.9686 0.0001 -2.3 ** 0.9014 0.0268 -3.49 ** 
  Time to max. pension 0.9947 0.0028 -1.83 * 1.0021 0.0110 0.20   
  Age at max. pension 1.0001 0.0001 1.92 * 1.0000 0.0002 -0.17   
  Replacement rate 1.0744 0.0263 2.93 ** 1.1310 0.0560 2.49 ** 
  Minimum pension 1.1235 0.0692 1.89 * 1.4381 0.1026 5.09 ** 
  Months since eligible(log) 1.3289 0.0358 10.55 ** 1.4757 0.0650 8.83 ** 
  Unemployment rate 1.0117 0.0040 2.92 ** 1.0121 0.0062 1.97 * 
  Constant 5454 0.0000 -5.39 ** 6453 10501 5.39 ** 
  abase category: no studies or primary studies 
  *significant at 5%          
  *significant at 10%  
 
Table A2.2 shows the results of our behavioural model. As expected, the 
retirement hazard increases with age (at a decreasing rate), but the most 
powerful effect is that associated with the variable “first year of eligibility”, 
which increases the hazard for both genders. This is consistent with the fact that 
between 55 and 60% of people (depending on the year considered) retire as soon 
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as they can (via the “ordinary” retirement pathway). The unemployed and those 
receiving unemployment benefit tend to retire later. Individuals are forced to 
retire (via the “ordinary” pathway) if they are unemployed at the legal 
retirement age. In our estimation, we eliminated these enforced retirement 
events as they do not reflect real choices. Hence, the unemployed present in our 
sample are mostly people eligible for early retirement, observed before their 
ordinary retirement age. Variables related to financial incentives behave as 
expected (see explanation above) and the effects of the replacement rate 
(individual ratio of pension to last wage) and the minimum pension are 
especially strong. The effect of the PV proxy is also very strong in the case of 
women (we compute changes in one euro). These results are in line with those 
reported by García-Pérez et al. (2013), who show that greater accrued pension 
rights are, as expected, associated with lower re-entry rates and higher 
retirement rates. The effect of the economic crisis (measured using the 
unemployment rate) is associated with delayed retirement for both genders.  
 
Men with higher education tend to remain less time in the labour market after 
becoming formally eligible for retirement (the same effect is observed for 
women but it is not significant). In contrast, the less educated are more likely to 
be affected by periods of unemployment and non-participation, especially 
during the crisis. This effect, combined with lower wages, may reduce their 
entry pension level, obliging them to work longer to achieve financial security. 
As explained, the retirement choice reflects heterogeneous tastes for work and 
leisure, and different budget constraints. Longer working careers may reflect 
work and leisure preferences more aligned to remaining in the labour market 
(associated with the more highly educated and those earning higher wages). 
However, retirement decisions also reflect budget constraints, supposedly more 
so for the less educated, and thus, they work in the opposite direction.  
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Appendix 3 The impact of the crisis  
 
The year 2007 is chosen as the base year so as to ensure the projections are not 
permanently affected by features attributable to the crisis starting in 2008. 
However, at the same time, we do need to take into account the temporary 
effects of the crisis. Given that we seek to simulate the long-run trends in 
pension expenditure, we opted in our model for a stylized simulation of the 
crisis period. First, we consider an increase in the unemployment rate induced 
by a temporary increase (decrease) in the job destruction (creation) rates, in line 
with the evolution observed in the early years of the crisis (as shown in Figure 
A3.1). Second, a reduction in the growth rate of wages is also considered. 
Specifically, the observed falls in inflation and productivity growth are taken as 
given, and it is assumed that they will recover to the long-run values projected 
by the Ageing Working Group simulations (European Commission, 2015a) (see 
Table 1 in Section 4).   
 
 
Figure A3.1 Evolution of job creation and destruction rates (quarterly 
values, 2008-2012)   
a) Job creation rate         b) Job destruction rate 
 
Note: The job creation rate = the share of unemployed that obtain employment in the next 
trimester. The job destruction rate = the share of workers who lose their job in the next trimester.  
Source: FEDEA, Observatorio laboral de la crisis (http://www.fedea.net/observatorios-
fedea/empleo/) 
 
In order to assess the impact of the economic crisis on our long-run projections, 
an alternative scenario without the effects of the crisis has been considered. To 
do so, constant values of productivity growth and inflation at 1.6 and 2%, 
respectively, are assumed across the whole simulation period. Figure A3.2 
illustrates the results of this hypothetical scenario without the crisis compared 
to the results obtained when simulating the effects of the crisis (note that in both 
cases we consider the introduction of the sustainability factor and the pension 
revaluation index implemented in the reform of 2013). As shown in panel a), 
our simulation of the crisis causes the unemployment rate to almost triple the 
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rate resulting from the hypothetical scenario without the crisis. 1 Second, the 
projected decrease in wage growth due to the crisis, results in a progressively 
lower growth in the average retirement pension. So that, in the short run, the 
crisis causes a significant increase in the benefit ratio, with wages falling sharply 
while pensions remain quite constant (panel b). However, this trend is reversed 
once the crisis terminates. The benefit ratio is always higher than the resulting 
from the scenario without the crisis.   
 
Figure A3.2 Impact of the economic crisis on unemployment and pensions 
 
Note: The solid lines correspond to the central scenario of our simulations, incorporating the 
reform implemented in 2013, while the dashed lines represent a hypothetical scenario with the 
reform but without the effects of the crisis. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
                                                         
1 Note that unemployment rate (panel a) in Figure A3.2 increases during the period 
corresponding to the retirement of baby boomers. This is the result of a composition effect due 
to the fact that unemployment rates are higher for older workers and might be offset in reality 
by the relative scarcity of labour supply.   
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Appendix 4. Sensitivity analysis: changes in productivity rates 
In this Appendix, we simulate two alternative scenarios of productivity: one in 
which productivity rates are 30% higher each year, and another in which these 
rates are 30% lower than those predicted in the central scenario of our 
simulations (and by previous studies, as discussed in the main text). The most 
obvious indicator to be affected by changes in productivity rates is the benefit 
ratio. The impact of productivity on this indicator has been discussed in previous 
studies. As Hernández de Cos et al. (2017) explain, a rebound in productivity 
growth leads to a further transitional reduction in the benefit ratio across the 
period in which cohorts experiencing lower productivity growth during their 
working lives enter retirement. However, given that contributory pensions are 
dependent on the workers’ labour history (both the number of years worked and 
the average wage over the last 25 years), increases in productivity – insofar as 
they generate wage gains – are eventually transferred to pensions. Consequently, 
increases in productivity have a positive and significant transitory effect on the 
financial situation of the public pension system, which is compensated for as 
pensions increase albeit at a smaller magnitude (see, for example, Conde-Ruiz, 
2017). In addition, both effects occur only as a result of a decrease in the benefit 
ratio. Given that all these effects are quite predictable (at least in terms of their 
direction), what remains more open to investigation is the impact of changes in 
productivity on pension levels and, more generally, on pension adequacy. 
Hernández de Cos et al. (2017) point out that higher rates of productivity growth 
might allow retirement pensions to be higher, even if their replacement rate were 
lower, so that the standard of living of retirees would improve, although their 
income relative to cohorts of the working-age population would decrease.  
Our model allows us to disentangle the magnitude and direction of these effects 
and their consequences in terms of pension sustainability and adequacy. The 
fact that the model is based on micro data means we can capture changes in 
poverty indicators, while the fact that it includes behavioural reactions to 
changes in incentives for retirement means we can investigate the interaction of 
changes in the benefit ratio with other factors affecting sustainability, namely, 
coverage rate and labour market factors.  
Figure A4 shows the effects of increasing (decreasing) productivity by 30% on 
four indicators: the benefit ratio, the pension expenditure to wage bill ratio, the 
average pension and the percentage of pensioners in risk of poverty (with a 
pension below the median income). These results seem to confirm the 
observations of the previous authors described above. Increasing productivity 
permits an increase in the average pension that is compatible with a worsening 
in relative measures, which comprise a reference to wage levels (risk of poverty 
and the benefit ratio). As expected, the sustainability of the pension system 
improves with increased productivity. The opposite is true for lower 
productivity, but the effect presents a higher magnitude, probably due to the 
asymmetric effect of maximum and minimum pension thresholds. Moreover, 
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the same rationale can be used to explain the evolution of the benefit ratio in the 
case of the crisis: markedly lower wages (the scenario with lower rates of 
productivity terminates in 2060 with an average wage of 41,184€, that is, 
13,000€ lower than that expected in the scenario with regular productivity 
projections) serve as a weak incentive to remain in the labour market, with 
consequent higher coverage rates and lower employment rates. 
 
Figure A4 The impact of the productivity assumptions  
 
Note: the average pension level is expressed in nominal euros per year 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
